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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Respondent,
vs.

Case No: 20110842-SC

MILO SIMONS,
Defendant / Petitioner.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER UPON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
&&*&

ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT
COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
As a preliminary matter, Simons recognizes that this Court may affirm the trial
court's ruling on the grounds initially held by the trial court (that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate Simons as a passenger based on the
evidence of paraphernalia found in the driver's door), rather than the grounds held by the
Court of Appeals (that the officer's questioning of Simons did not measurably extend the
detention). "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed
from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record...'" Bailey
v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, U 10, 52 P.3d 1158. The initial argument in the State's brief is
directed at supporting the trial court's reasoning, and its second argument is directed at
the argument underlying the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals. Simons disagrees
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with both the decisions of the trial court and the court of appeals. However, even if this
Court chooses to affirm the trial court based on a finding of reasonable suspicion to
investigate Simons as a passenger (the trial court's finding), Simons asserts it is
appropriate for this Court to address the holding of the Court of Appeals as well, where it
deals with the scope and reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment detention/seizure,
because of this Court's significant interest in establishing state-wide standards to guide
law enforcement and prosecutorial officials in this area. See State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18,
t 7, 229 P.3d 650 ("there must be state-wide standards"); State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, t
14, 103 P.3d 699 (in consent search cases there should be uniform legal rules); State v.
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^j 25, 63 P.3d 650 (there should be state-wide standards in search
and seizure cases to "help ensure different trial judges will reach the same legal
conclusions in cases that have little factual difference."); State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,
P.3d 590. Therefore, Simons asks this Court to address the question of whether or not the
police measurably extended the traffic stop even if the trial court's denial is affirmed on
other grounds,
1. The police did not have reasonable suspicion that Simons, as a passenger, was
involved in criminal activity to independently justify his detention
The first point in the State's brief is because Simons was in the car with the driver
who was suspected of DUI and possession of drug paraphernalia the police had
reasonable suspicion or even probable cause to detain or arrests Simons. Respondent's
Brief at 10-17. The State claims that, because the degree of proof necessary for an
investigative detention is "modest" (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879-
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80, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)) and detention is "permissible if the officer's
suspicion cis supported by specific and articulable facts as well as any rational inferences
drawn from those facts'" {State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ^[14, 147 P.3d 425), the police
here were justified in detaining and investigating Simons based on the evidence observed
implicating the driver/co-defendant. Respondent's Brief at 11-12. The State cites several
United States Supreme Court cases to support its claim that Deputy Luke was justified in
investigating Simons based upon the evidence discovered in the driver's side door
compartment. The most relevant of which are Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119
S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999), Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795,
157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003), and United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed
201 (1948). Respondent's Brief at 14-17. Simons now responds to the State's position
with a closer examination of those cases and asserts that factual differences make this
case distinguishable.
The State argues that under Pringle, because Simons "and his companion were in
a relatively small automobile, not a public tavern" the police were justified in making the
inference that "the passenger is engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and [that
both] have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing."
Respondent's Brief at 16-17 (citation omitted).

The State argues if "discovery of

contraband in the backseat of a car satisfies the probable cause burden for arresting a
front seat passenger", as it did in Pringle, then "Deputy Luke's discovery of chewed
paraphernalia in the driver's door certainly satisfies" the less demanding requirement of
reasonable suspicion. Respondent's Brief at 17. The State suggests that the quantitative
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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difference between proof necessary for probable cause and proof necessary for
reasonable suspicion should require that the evidence here satisfies the lower threshold.
However, a comparison of the facts in Pringle to the facts in this case reveals a
qualitative difference between the evidence, and that qualitative difference suggests the
police here had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to suspect Simons was
involved in any criminal activity and was merely in close proximity to a person who was.
In Pringle the police stopped a passenger vehicle, occupied by three men, for
speeding. "The officer asked [the driver] for his license and registration" and when he
"opened the glove compartment to retrieve the vehicle registration, the officer observed a
large amount of rolled-up money in the glove compartment." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 368.
After the driver's information did not return any outstanding violations the "officer
returned to the stopped car, had [the driver] get out, and issued him an oral warning."
Pringle, at 386. A second officer then asked if the driver "had any weapons or narcotics
in the vehicle" and the driver "indicated that he did not" and "consented to a search of the
vehicle," M, at 386. "The search yielded $763 from the glove compartment and five
plastic baggies containing cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest." Id.
The police "questioned all three men about the ownership of the drugs and
money" but the "men offered no information" and all three were placed under arrest and
transported to the police station. Id., at 368-69. The defendant, the front seat passenger,
moved to suppress a confession he later made arguing it was "the fruit of an illegal
arrest" but the motion was denied because the trial court found there was probable cause
to arrest him. Id., at 369. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed his conviction
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"holding that, absent specific facts tending to show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or
control over the drugs, 'the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was
a front seat passenger in a car being driven by its owner is insufficient to establish
probable cause for an arrest for possession.'" Id., at 369 (citing Pringle, 370 Md. 525,
545, 805 A.2d 1016, 1027 (Md. 2002)).
The United States Supreme Court granted cert. "It [was] uncontested... that the
officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine baggies containing suspected cocaine,
had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed... The sole question [before
the Court was] whether the officer had probable cause to believe Pringle", the front seat
passenger, "committed that crime." Id., at 370. "To determine whether an officer had
probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and
then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer, amount to' probable cause..." Id., at 371 (citing Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)).
The Court concluded "it an entirely reasonable inference... that any or all three of
the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine"
based on the fact that there was $763 in cash in the glove box directly in front of the
defendant and there was five bags of cocaine behind the backseat armrest and accessible
to all three men. Id., at 372. Additionally, the Court noted that Pringle, like Houghton
and unlike Ybarra, involved individuals riding together in a car so it "was reasonable for
the officer to infer a common enterprise among the three men" because the nature of the
enterprise (drug dealing) is one "which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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person with the potential to furnish evidence against him." Id., at 373. The Court noted
that unlike the facts in Ybarra, where patrons of a bar were not allowed to be searched
based on "mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity"
"absent individualized suspicion", the fact that Pringle was in the car with large
quantities of drugs and cash gave the police reason to believe he was involved. Id, at
373. The Court also noted, unlike Di Re where there was "no information implicating"
the defendant other than presence in the vehicle with a suspect who had been identified,
neither of Pringle's companions were singled out by the evidence and therefore each of
them were as likely to have been attached to the contraband. Id., at 373-34. Quoting
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), the Court said
"[w]here the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported
by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be
undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists
probable cause to search or seize another..." Pringle, at 372-73.
Although this is not a case where probable cause was required, the principle is the
same, when a person is being investigated (as opposed to a place) reasonable suspicion
must be particularized with respect to that person.1

1

"Under the Fourth Amendment, government officials may conduct an investigatory stop
of a vehicle if they possess 'reasonable suspicion: a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting that particular person stopped of criminal activity... Such reasonable
suspicion 'requires specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and
reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting that a particular person is engaged in
criminal conduct.'" United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
United States v. Thomas, 211 F.Ed. 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The qualitative factual distinctions between Pringle and this case significantly
weaken the State's position. First, the evidence discovered in Pringle was either closer to
or as close to the passenger defendant as it was the other vehicle occupants. But the
evidence here, the paraphernalia in the driver's door compartment, was solely within the
driver's reach and likely only within the drivers knowledge. In Pringle the money
evidence was in the glove compartment, directly in front of the defendant as the front seat
passenger {Pringle, at 368, 372), and the drug evidence was found behind the upright
armrest in the back-seat, "accessible to all three men" {Pringle, at 368, 372) including the
defendant.

But here the evidence of intoxication was limited to the driver and the

paraphernalia evidence was discovered in the driver's side door compartment (R.48,
R.92: 6, 8, 23, 24, 25), well away from the reach, view, and control of the front seat
passenger. The officer testified that it only came into view after the driver's door was
opened even though that same officer had already looked into the vehicle from the
passenger window, suggesting that Simons could not have seen it with from the
passenger seat. R.92: 5-7.
Next, the evidence in Pringle suggested the crime was drug dealing, {Pringle, at
373 ("[t]he quantity of drugs and cash in the car indicated a likelihood of drug dealing")),
while the evidence here suggested DUI, possession of paraphernalia and possibly prior
use of a controlled substance (R.92: 6 (driver had bloodshot eyes, rapid speech and
movement), 92: 8 (baggies commonly used to store drugs), 92: 8 (powder and crystal
residue in the bags). The important distinction from Pringle is that drug dealing was
found to be "an enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Machine-generated OCR, may

person with the potential to furnish evidence against him" (i.e. large amounts of cash and
drugs), which leads to the inference that someone in the presence of such evidence is
likely to be involved, while the evidence of DUI, paraphernalia, and prior use should not
generate the same inference. Pringle, at 374.
Thus, the evidence in Pringle, which created a legitimate inference of criminal
activity to all of the passengers in the vehicle, is qualitatively different from the evidence
discovered in this case. Had the paraphernalia in this case been in plain view in the
console between Sorenson and Simons, or had the officers reported similar evidence of
impairment in Simons then such an inference may be warranted. But where all the
evidence pointed only to, and directly to, the driver the police did not have any specific
and articulable suspicion, objective or otherwise, to support a belief that Simons was
engaged in criminal activity.
The State argues that under Houghton "it is reasonable in such cases to believe
that the passenger is 'engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and [that both]
have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.'"
Respondent's Brief at 17 {citing Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, at 304-05). The State asserts
under Houghton "Deputy Luke's discovery of chewed paraphernalia in the driver's door
certainly satisfies the 'less demanding' reasonable suspicion burden... that is required for
making the much 'less intrusive' investigative query..." Respondent's Brief at 17
(internal cites omitted). The State claims "Deputy Luke would have been justified in
searching any belongings that Petitioner may have had in the car" and presumably,
therefore the police could also have detained Simons under the lower standard.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent's Brief at 17. This argument also ignores the qualitative differences between
the facts in Houghton and the facts in this case.
In Houghton the police stopped a vehicle "for speeding and driving with a faulty
brake light." Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 297.

The police noticed an item of drug

paraphernalia in the shirt pocket of the driver and ordered the passengers out of the car,
asked them for identification, and then began searching the car for contraband. Houghton,
526 U.S. at 298. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered in her purse
"as the fruit of a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" and the trial court
"held that the officer had probable cause to search the car for contraband, and, by
extension, any containers therein that could hold such contraband." Id., at 298-99. She
claimed the police did not have probable cause to search her purse based on the evidence
of paraphernalia found in the driver's pocket.
Up to the point at which the car was searched, the factual circumstances in
Houghton were similar to this case because Simons' companion was pulled over for a
traffic matter and paraphernalia was discovered in plain sight during that investigation.
However, the similarities stop there. In Houghton the officers then performed a search of
the vehicle for contraband, justified by probable cause based on the paraphernalia, and
found a purse, which the defendant claimed was hers. Eventually the police discovered
drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine inside the purse. Here the police did not
continue to investigate their suspicion of DUI or paraphernalia, they stopped that
investigation in order to investigate Simons.
In Houghton the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the conviction by finding that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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when the police are searching a vehicle based on probable cause, "if the officer knows or
should know that a container is the personal effect of a passenger who is not suspected of
criminal activity, then the container is outside the scope of the search unless someone had
the opportunity to conceal the contraband within the personal effect to avoid detection."
Id., at 299 {citing Houghton, 956 P.2d 363, 372 (WY. 1998)). Because the officer
'"knew or should have known that the purse did not belong to the driver, but to one of the
passengers,' and because 'there was no probable cause to search the passengers' personal
effects and no reason to believe that contraband had been placed within the purse'" the
search was illegal Id,
The U.S. Supreme Court examined whether it mattered that the purse did not
belong to the driver. In reversing the Wyoming court, the Supreme Court noted that
"[t]he critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is
suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific 'things'
to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought." Id., at
302 {citing lurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed2d 525
(1978)). Thus, when the search is based on probable cause, it is not that the police have
probable cause that a owner of the property has been involved with criminal activity and
therefore evidence of that activity may be found on his property, rather it is that there is
reason to suspect that evidence of criminal activity is likely to be discovered in a certain
location, like inside a car. In support of its holding the Court noted that "a car passenger
— unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra — will often be engaged in a common
enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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evidence of their wrongdoing." Id., at 304. The State's brief asserts that "Deputy Luke
would have been justified in searching any belongings that [Simons] may have had in the
car" under Houghton presumably to suggest that if the police had probable cause to
search his containers then they certainly had reasonable suspicion to detain and
investigate him. Respondent's Brief at 17. Under Houghton that appears to be correct.
But here the police did not search the car or its contents as a result of discovering the
driver's drug paraphernalia, rather they began to investigate Simons and his person.
The Court drew the line when the issue of searching a person was considered.
Unlike a container belonging to a passenger inside a vehicle for which there is probable
cause to search, "the heightened protection afforded against searches of one's person"
prohibits the police from extending such searches to a passenger's body or clothing.
Houghton, at 303. This is where the State's appeal to Houghton breaks down. Here
Deputy Luke did not search the vehicle based on the evidence found on the driver, rather
Luke approached Simons at the passenger door and began investigating Simons, asking
him what he had on his person. The principle underlying Ybarra is important even
though it involved mere presence in a bar and this case involves mere presence in a
vehicle. The principle in Ybarra is that, when the search warrant was issued, there was
no reason to believe (besides proximity) that anyone else at the tavern would be violating
the law. The same cannot be said for Pringle, when probable cause was established, the
police had reasons beyond proximity to believe the defendant was involved in criminal
activity related to the evidence they had discovered. And in Houghton, the defendant's
person was not being investigated, only her property (which does not enjoy the same
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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elevated level of protection) and the property's proximity to the driver created a
probability that contraband was hidden therein gave reason to suspect evidence of
criminal activity would be found there. But here, evidence of the driver's impairment
and paraphernalia is not in any way (beside proximity) evidence of criminal activity on
the part of Simons and it could not have given the police reasonable suspicion to believe
Simons had committed a crime.
In Pringle the nature of the suspected criminal conduct, dealing drugs, combined
with the proximity of the contraband to the defendant justified an inference and created
suspicion beyond a mere hunch that the defendant was likely involved in criminal
activity. In Houghton the nature of the search, a search of the vehicle and the containers
found therein, allowed the police to search the defendant's purse even though the
paraphernalia evidence justifying the search was limited to the driver. In Ybarra the
nature of the suspected criminal conduct, possession of controlled substances, combined
with the proximity of the defendant from the suspected contraband, in the same room as
those reported to have drugs, did not justify an inference implicating the defendant and
therefore did not create reasonable suspicion. And in De Ri the nature of the suspected
criminal conduct, the driver and another passenger's possession of counterfeit gas ration
coupons, combined with the proximity of the defendant from the suspects, in the same
car, did not justify an inference implicating the defendant, especially where the informant
only implicated the driver.
Under the totality of the evidence, we see no reason to suspect that Simons, as a
passenger, had engaged in any criminal activity. The trial court found
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In this case Deputy Luke's initial suspicion of driving while impaired was
quickly supplemented by his observation of drug paraphernalia in plain
sight when the car door was properly opened to remove Mr. Sorenson to
investigate the possible DUI charge. The baggies were not only strongly
likely to be paraphernalia, the used condition implied use of the drugs they
might have contained. That suspicion coupled with the signs of possible
impairment lead to reasonable suspicion and concern about both occupants
of the car. The tactics including a quick search of Mr. Sorenson's person
and questioning Mr. Simons about drug possession or use, followed by a
search of his person... [] were reasonably suggested by his concerns. Once
it was confirmed that Mr. Simons was in possession of drug paraphernalia,
arrest and a further, concurrent search of his person was justified. Consent
of either Defendant to the search was irrelevant and the Court makes no
finding on that point.
R. 47-46. The court found there was evidence the codefendant was driving impaired
there was evidence that paraphernalia was in the car and that the bags may have
contained drugs at an earlier time. The testimony supports each of these factual findings.
See R. 92: 6 (Sorenson had "very watery eyes that were bloodshot", he had "very rapid
speech and movement", he moved constantly, and blurted out "I'm not drunk"); 92: 8
(the baggies contained white powder and crystal residues).
The relevant legal conclusion is that, based on the driver's signs of impairment,
the discovery of the baggies in the driver's door, and the used condition of the baggies,
Officer Luke had reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate both the driver and
Simons. The problem is that none of the facts observed and reported by the officer were
particularized to Simons and the trial court's conclusion that the police had "reasonable
suspicion and concern about both occupants of the car" ignores the requirement that the
evidence be particularized to the individual the police detain and investigate. R.47. Here,
the nature of the observed criminal activity, the driver's possible DUI and paraphernalia,
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combined with the proximity of Simons to the driver and his contraband does not justify
the inference implicating Simons in any criminal conduct and thus did not create
reasonable suspicion to independently detain or investigate Simons.

The trial court's

conclusion was erroneous and the State's arguments are incorrect. This Court should not
affirm the trial court's denial on this ground.
2. The police unlawfully extended the scope of the investigation because the
detention was measurably extended
The State understandably titles its second section "the deputy's question to
Petitioner did not unreasonably delay the investigation", likely to avoid the
'measurably extend' language of the controlling cases because the State cannot confront
the plain meaning of the controlling cases. Respondent's Brief at 18 (emphasis added).
Instead of arguing that the police did not measurably extend the stop the State redirects
the Court to more favorable search and seizure language. The State notes that traffic
stops must not be "unnecessarily prolonged]" (Sharpe...), and that "the Fourth
Amendment's ultimate touchstone is reasonableness" (Brigham City V. Stuart, 547 U.S.
389, 389, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006)). The State then contends that under
the totality of the circumstances the duration of the stop was not unreasonable and
therefore, everything within the stop was reasonable, regardless of whether it was related
or whether any extension was measurable. See Respondent's Brief at 18-24, specifically
at 21 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005),
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and Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)).2 But the
State's redirection misses the point of Simon's claims and the State's argument allows for
individual constitutional violations to go unprotected so long as, at a distance, the
complete picture looks like the detention did not last an unreasonable amount of time.
This cannot be the rule.
The State's brief fails to address the real contention of this case, which is whether
the police can completely avoid the requirements of Hansen, Baker, and Johnson, by
prolonging, or delaying the conclusion of, an otherwise justified stop in order to perform
investigations that would be unlawful if performed after the justified purpose was
concluded. In other words the State avoids the crucial questions: Could the officer in
Hansen have delayed releasing the defendant with a warning in order to question him
about "alcohol, drugs, or weapons"? State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 13, 63 P.3d 650.
Was it illegal only because it occurred after he should have been free to leave? Could the
officers in Baker have delayed arresting the driver in order to conduct an unjustified
investigation of the passengers? Could the police in Johnson, rather than questioning the
passengers simultaneous with the driver, have delayed investigating the driver in order to

In Mena the additional immigration questioning did not measurably extend the duration
of the defendant's detention during the execution of a search warrant because she was
being detained and questioned u[w]hile the search proceeded" by other officers. Mena,
544 U.S. 93, 96. Had the police stopped the search to interrogate her then the outcome
would be different.
In Caballes the deployment of the K9 unit did not measurably extend the duration of a
level 2 detention because the dog sniff was conducted "[w]hile [the officer] was in the
process of writing a warning ticket." Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406. Had the police
stopped the process of administering the ticket in order to run the dog around the vehicle
then the outcome would have been different.
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investigate and search the passengers? Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781,
172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009).
Simons asserts that these questions are critical and that the answer to all these
questions must be a clear NO, because regardless of whether it occurs before or after the
conclusion of the justified stop, an additional investigation that "is not reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances that justified the inference in the first place..." {Hansen,
2002 UT 125, Tj 29 {citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994))), nor by
any additional evidence observed during the course of the stop is not justified and
unreasonable. To extend the detention in order to engage in unjustified investigation
violates the spirit of each of these cases, even if extension is brief. To focus, as the State
does, on the brevity of the extension is a tactic used to distract from the crux of
constitutional issues, which is whether the additional investigation is justified by
reasonable suspicion. Further, the State's emphasis on the technical distinction, that the
additional investigation occurs before the conclusion of the stop, is only determinative if
the justified purpose of the stop is not interrupted by the additional investigation, as was
the case in Johnson and Caballes, and Mena, and not the case here.
It is telling that the State's brief fails to address the fact that the additional
detention that occurs when Deputy Luke stops investigating the driver, the person who is
suspected of DUI and clearly guilty of possessing paraphernalia, and begins in
investigating Simons, the person he has no reason to suspect has done anything illegal.
Contrary to the State's assertion that the "unrelated question" to Simons occurred "while
Deputy Luke 'continued to investigate [the driver's] sobriety' as well as the contraband
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possession...", in fact this investigation had stopped. Luke had the other officer just wait
with the driver while Luke went to investigate Simons, prior to field sobriety tests, prior
to issuing of a citation, prior to the arrest. R.92: 25 (Luke "had the assisting officer just
stand by with Mr. Sorenson."). Just standing by is not "a means of investigation that is
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132
(quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605
(1985)).
The court of appeals decision strangely finds no measurable extension, no
additional detention. Simons, 2011 UT App 251, ^f 11 ("Under these circumstances, [the
court was] convinced that the question did not measurably extend the length of the traffic
stop...").

It is strange because the court describes the measurable extension in the

sentences immediately preceding the finding, where Luke is shown to have "walked
immediately from the driver's side to the passenger side and ask Simons if he had
anything on his person..." Id

That period of time, although admittedly short, is

measurable (like Hansen (two questions) and Baker (two minutes)), and unlike the facts
in Johnson, Caballes, and Mena, did not occur during any other justified simultaneous
police conduct.
The State also seems to suggest that the Utah cases of Hansen and Chapman have
been overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Johnson. Respondent's Brief at
24. But Simons asserts that the holdings in each of these cases are consistent with
Johnson and, when combined with this Court's holding in Baker, demonstrate the precise
principle that makes the detention in this case illegal. As argued in Simon's initial brief
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(see Petitioner's Brief at 18-24), the police may detain passengers for the duration of the
traffic stop and they must be released when the purpose of the stop concludes. If during
the course of the stop the police begin to investigate the passengers without independent
suspicion that investigation cannot measurably extend the duration of the stop, and a stop
is not measurably extended if the additional investigation occurs simultaneous to the
justified police conduct {Johnson). Once a stop is made the detention must not last
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop {State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d
446 (Utah 1996)), and something as simple and quick as two questions can constitute and
illegal extension {Hansen). These cases continue to accurately express the constitutional
rules and are completely consistent with each other and with the holding in Johnson.
Despite the State's assertion, Johnson does not create a de minimus exception to the
measurably extend rule. Instead it demonstrates the same principles demonstrated in
Mena, Caballes, and Baker, namely, extension is about the use of the time for which
people are detained, not about the length. If the police use detention time to quickly and
diligently address justified suspicions and simultaneously investigate other matters, no
unauthorized extension occurs. But if the police have a person detained, justified by one
purpose, and use that detention in order to go fishing for evidence of other crimes instead
of dealing with the justified purpose and the detention lasts longer than necessary, then
the extension to the detention is not justified and is unreasonable.
The State seems to be saying it is appropriate for the police to seize and
investigate someone without particularized suspicion (i.e. unreasonably) if only takes a
few extra seconds, as it did here, so long as that occurs before the justified purpose of the
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stop is completed. Where that rationale fails is that it almost always only takes a few
seconds for the police to obtain evidence against someone under circumstances that
violate a person's constitutional rights. It may only take a few seconds for the police to
discover contraband if they storm through your front door without a warrant. It may only
takes a few seconds for the police to empty the contents of your pockets as you pass them
on the street.

Brevity is not a shield the State can hide behind in this context.

Furthermore, if the State was correct the police would have an incentive to postpone
concluding an arrest or citation and begin fishing for evidence of other crimes for which
they have no reason to believe they will find just so long as they do it quickly. If the
State is correct then the police in Baker could simply have postponed arresting the driver
and have him "stand by" while they called the K9 in to complete the search even though
it was unrelated and unjustified.

This technical adjustment would not have saved the

police in Baker and should not save the police here.
The State wants this Court affirm the court of appeals' decision and create a de
minimus exception to the 'measurably extend' rule but doing so would be counter to the
controlling cases and would betray the spirit of our constitutional protections. The fact
that the overall length of the stop did not become unreasonable when Luke added his
extra investigation and because it happened before he arrested Sorenson does not change
the fact that the extra investigation was not supported by reasonable suspicion and it did
not occur simultaneous to the investigation/arrest of the driver. The additional
investigation therefore measurably extended the duration of the stop without any
justification. That extension, even though it was only a few seconds, was unreasonable
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and unauthorized under the constitution and this Court should not approve of such
conduct.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
In conclusion, the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's
denial of the motion to suppress was an error because it created a de minimus exception
to the measurable extension rule contrary to the case law of this Court and the United
States Supreme Court.

The holding also authorizes and incentivized the police to

postpone the conclusion of otherwise legitimate detentions in order to go on fishing
expeditions to investigate matters not supported by reasonable suspicion.

The trial

court's finding that the police had "reasonable suspicion and concern about both
occupants of the car" is also erroneous because there were no specific articulable facts
which would have linked Simons to criminal activity, thus the trial court should not be
upheld on those grounds.
Petitioner now asks this Court to reverse the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
and remand this case to the District Court with order allowing Simons to withdraw his
plea and an order suppressing any evidence discovered as a result of his illegal detention.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \T> day of /\d&ifC

, 2012.

:a^_

Douglas J. ThOTipson
AttorneyTof Petitioner/Defendant
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